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In an effort to protect the exercise of free speech and petitioning activity 
against meritless defamation suits, numerous states have enacted laws to deter 
“SLAPP”—“strategic lawsuit against public participation”—suits.1 Such 
strike suits often involve speech on matters of public concern and would have 
no practical chance of prevailing under current First Amendment doctrine.2 
However, the time and expenses associated with getting these claims 
dismissed are often enough to intimidate would-be speakers into silence. 
State “anti-SLAPP” laws require the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood 
of success on the merits for speech-related tort claims, providing a quick and 
easy way for defendants to get meritless claims dismissed at the pleadings stage, 
prior to potentially costly discovery.3 Because these anti-SLAPP motions spare 
defendants a great deal of time and expense, they help blunt the threat of SLAPP 
suits. But debates within the federal courts of appeals may jeopardize the 
effectiveness of anti-SLAPP statutes. In 2015, the D.C. Circuit created a circuit 
split by refusing to apply Washington, D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute, claiming it 
conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and Rule 56 summary 
judgment motions.4 
The anti-SLAPP circuit split now offers the Supreme Court a unique 
opportunity to correct the broader confusion over the relationship between the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state laws. By holding that anti-SLAPP 
statutes do not conflict with the Federal Rules based on an analysis of the 
purposes underlying both provisions, the Supreme Court could go a long way in 
clarifying how the Federal Rules operate.5 Under the Rules Enabling Act, the 
Federal Rules will control litigation in federal courts—provided that they do not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify” substantive rights given by law.6 But just what 
constitutes a substantive right has vexed judges and academics since the Enabling 
Act’s inception in the 1930s. It was this same confusion that led the D.C. Circuit 
to conclude that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 preclude the operation of anti-SLAPP 
 
1 Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 704 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016). 
2 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (requiring “public figures” and 
“public officials” to show actual malice in libel or slander suits (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967))); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974) (explaining that a 
“public figure” is anyone who is “intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions 
or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large” (citation omitted)); 
see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (requiring the plaintiff to “bear 
the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages” in defamation suits against 
media defendants); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding 
that appellate courts should “make an independent examination of the whole record” to ensure that 
a judgment does not impermissibly intrude on protected free speech). 
3 See infra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 
4 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
5 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (examining the 
policies underlying Rule 23 vis-à-vis a state provision to conclude that the two do not conflict). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
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statutes in federal court. However, by treating the question of whether the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preclude state-law protections in federal court as 
one akin to preemption, as Professors Stephen Burbank and Tobias Barrington 
Wolff have advocated,7 a more coherent answer to the anti-SLAPP-application 
problem is possible.  
As this Comment will argue, there is no sufficiently strong federal interest 
in having the Federal Rules “preempt” the operation of anti-SLAPP 
protections in federal court. Instead, straightforward preemption analysis 
shows that the balance favors having anti-SLAPP motions available to federal 
litigants. Part I examines the particulars of anti-SLAPP statutes and the 
circuit split over whether anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity 
proceedings. Part II then provides context for the anti-SLAPP-application 
debate by reviewing the Supreme Court’s conflicting interpretations of the 
Enabling Act. Part III examines Enabling Act precedent through the lens of 
preemption analysis, which provides a more coherent explanation for when 
the Court is likely to find that the operation of the Federal Rules supersedes 
state law. Based on insights gathered from the preemption-analysis approach, 
Part IV considers the use of anti-SLAPP motions in federal court. Finally, 
this Comment concludes that no conflict exists between federal interests and 
anti-SLAPP provisions. Thus, anti-SLAPP motions should be available to 
defendants in federal court. 
I. ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES AND THE QUESTION THEY POSE IN 
FEDERAL DIVERSITY LITIGATION 
Prompted by concerns that the prospect of litigating meritless claims may 
discourage protected speech or petitioning activity, approximately thirty 
states, territories, and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP 
statutes.8 An additional two states, Colorado and West Virginia, adopted 
anti-SLAPP protections by judicial decision.9 The policy undergirding these 
anti-SLAPP provisions is to protect against the filing of state slander, libel, 
and other speech-related claims meant to chill the exercise of free speech and 
petitioning activity.10 The fear is that potential speakers will be so intimidated 
 
7 See infra note 45. 
8 State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://www.anti-slapp.org/your-
states-free-speech-protection/ [https://perma.cc/V7LH-BV6C]. 
9 Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1368-69 (Colo. 1984); Harris 
v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993). 
10 See Atlanta Humane Soc’y v. Harkins, 603 S.E.2d 289, 292 (Ga. 2004) (“[T]he purposes of 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute are to encourage citizen participation in matters of public significance 
through the exercise of the right of free speech and the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances, and to prevent their valid exercise from being chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”). 
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by the burden and expense of litigating these claims, they will refrain from 
engaging in protected speech.11 
Anti-SLAPP statutes do not preclude speech-related suits. Rather, they 
create special motions to dismiss actions brought against defendants based on 
“any claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues 
of public interest.”12 To succeed, the defendant must make a “prima facie 
showing that the claim at issue arises from an act in furtherance of the right 
of advocacy on issues of public interest.”13 The burden then falls on the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that “the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.”14 If 
the plaintiff succeeds, the motion is denied; otherwise, the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss is granted.15 To keep costs to the defendant low, discovery is stayed 
during the pendency of the motion.16 If the motion is granted, the defendant 
can then seek costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.17 
Proponents of anti-SLAPP statutes argue that they protect substantive 
rights—free speech and advocacy, without fear of reprisal through costly 
litigation—via targeted procedural means.18 But recently, federal circuits have 
 
11 See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 118 (5th ed. 
2014) (explaining how anti-SLAPP statutes “try to decrease the ‘chilling effect’ of certain kinds of 
libel litigation and other speech-restrictive litigation”). 
12 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(a) (West 2012); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 
(2012) (“When a moving party asserts that the civil claims . . . are based on the moving party’s 
exercise of the moving party’s right of petition under the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of Maine, the moving party may bring a special motion to dismiss.”). 
13 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012). 
14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) 
(West 2015) (stating that the plaintiff must establish “that there is a probability that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the claim”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (“The court shall grant the special 
motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s 
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in 
law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party.”). 
15 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012). 
16 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(c)(1) 
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). 
17 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5504(a) 
(West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). Anti-SLAPP statutes also tend to include 
interlocutory appeal provisions—raising collateral order doctrine issues. See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 
629 F.3d 79, 83-85 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction exists because deciding the 
anti-SLAPP issue would be conclusive to “the disputed question” and distinct from the merits); see 
also Breazeale v. Victim Servs., Inc., Nos. 15-16549, 16-16495, 2017 WL 6601779, at *6 (9th Cir. Dec. 
27, 2017) (discussing the appealability of decisions on anti-SLAPP motions under California law). 
This Comment, however, will leave the collateral order dispute for another day. 
18 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015) (“The Legislature finds and 
declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid 
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. 
The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued 
participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled 
through abuse of the judicial process.”). 
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divided over whether anti-SLAPP statutes are “procedural” or “substantive” 
for Enabling Act purposes. The disagreement centers on whether Rules 
12(b)(6) and 56 preclude the operation of the anti-SLAPP motions in federal 
proceedings. This debate has now created a circuit split whose ultimate 
resolution may come only through Supreme Court review. And in reviewing 
anti-SLAPP statutes, the Court would have the opportunity to clarify its own 
Enabling Act jurisprudence. The remainder of this Part will briefly survey 
some of the more important courts of appeals opinions regarding the place of 
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court. 
In Godin v. Schencks, the First Circuit held that Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute 
must be applied in federal court.19 A “straightforward reading” of Rules 
12(b)(6) and 56, the court said, does not indicate that those Rules were “meant 
to control the particular issues.”20 Further, “a Federal Rule ‘cannot govern a 
particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in 
the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that 
it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.’”21 
The court went on to hold that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not “address 
the same subject” as the anti-SLAPP statute.22 Because the anti-SLAPP 
statute addresses “special procedures for state claims,” it does not seek to 
displace the “general federal procedures governing all categories of cases.”23 
In other words, “Maine has not created a substitute to the Federal Rules, 
but instead created a supplemental and substantive rule to provide added 
protections, beyond those in Rules 12 and 56, to defendants who are named 
as parties because of constitutional petitioning activities.”24 Thus, because 
of the substantive purposes behind Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, distinct 
from the functioning of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, finding a conflict was both 
unnecessary and inappropriate. 
In contrast to the First Circuit, the D.C. Circuit found a conflict between 
D.C.’s anti-SLAPP provision and Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.25 Specifically, the 
 
19 629 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2010). 
20 Id. at 86. 
21 Id. at 87 (emphasis added) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
22 Id. at 88 (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 402). The court also emphasized how “the 
allocation of burden of proof is substantive in nature and controlled by state law.” Id. at 89. 
23 Id. at 88. 
24 Id. Specifically, the anti-SLAPP statute provides “a mechanism” for dismissing a complaint 
because “the plaintiff cannot meet the special rules Maine has created to protect such petitioning 
activity against lawsuits.” Id. at 89. The anti-SLAPP motion is neither testing the sufficiency of the 
complaint nor granting judgment in the absence of material facts; Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do both. 
Id. at 88. 
25 See Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Federal Rules 
12 and 56 answer the same question as the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act . . . . A federal court exercising 
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court viewed D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute as imposing a higher burden on 
getting to trial than Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.26 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff 
need only show that a claim “is plausible on its face.”27 Indeed, a case “may 
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged 
is improbable.”28 Because the anti-SLAPP statute and Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 
“answer the same question” about a claim’s viability, but the anti-SLAPP 
statute makes getting to trial more difficult for the plaintiff, it conflicts with 
the Federal Rules and cannot be applied.29 Thus, from the D.C. Circuit’s 
perspective, the Federal Rules and the anti-SLAPP statute cannot coexist. 
Other circuits have also seen the anti-SLAPP controversy come to a head. 
The Ninth Circuit was the first to hold that anti-SLAPP statutes should apply 
in federal court because they “can exist side by side” with the Federal Rules.30 
The court noted that if a defendant were unsuccessful in obtaining relief 
through the anti-SLAPP motion, he could still bring a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 
56 motion.31 The anti-SLAPP provision also protects individual 
“constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of 
grievances,” something the Federal Rules do not directly address.32 
Despite this longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent, Judge Kozinski waged 
an all-out assault on applying anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court. 
Specifically, he viewed anti-SLAPP statutes as impermissible alterations to 
the standards set by Rules 12(b)(6) and 56.33 He also believed that the Federal 
Rules operate as “an integrated program of pre-trial, trial and post-trial 
procedures,” and that anti-SLAPP statutes create “an ugly gash” in the ordinary 
 
diversity jurisdiction therefore must apply Federal Rules 12 and 56 instead of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP 
Act’s special motion to dismiss provision.”). 
26 See id. at 1334 (discussing how there is a conflict because “the plaintiff is not able to get to 
trial just by meeting those Rules 12 and 56 standards”—which “do not require a plaintiff to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits”). 
27 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). 
28 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
29 Id. at 1336. 
30 United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 973 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015)). 
33 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring) (complaining that the anti-SLAPP’s probability of success standard is much higher than 
Rule 12(b)(6)’s plausibility standard: “The plausibility standard isn’t a floor or a ceiling from which we 
can depart. Using California’s standard in federal court means that some plaintiffs with plausible claims 
will have their cases dismissed before they’ve had a chance to gather supporting evidence. It’s obvious 
that the two standards conflict.”); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (stating that an anti-SLAPP statute “creates no substantive rights,” but only 
“provides a procedural mechanism for vindicating existing rights”); id. at 274 (arguing that defendants 
can “test the factual sufficiency of a plaintiff ’s case prior to any discovery [and get a more favorable] 
standard for surviving summary judgment by requiring a plaintiff to show a ‘reasonable probability’ that 
he will prevail, rather than merely a triable issue of fact”). 
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procedural process.34 Despite his colorful language, Judge Kozinski’s 
arguments have not carried the day in the Ninth Circuit.35 But Judge 
Kozinski’s views are not outliers. Other circuit judges argue that  
anti-SLAPP statutes should not apply in federal courts.36 
The debate involving anti-SLAPP statutes is not unique. Rather, it is part 
of a broader struggle to understand the relationship between the Federal Rules 
and state laws. Much of this misunderstanding persists because the legal 
community tries to catalogue issues as “substantive” or “procedural.”37 If it is 
a procedural issue, the Federal Rules cover the situation. But if it is substantive, 
then state law prevails. However, many laws may not be amenable to clear-cut 
labels and categories. Such is the case with anti-SLAPP statutes, which have 
substantive aims but use court procedure to further those goals. Truly 
understanding whether anti-SLAPP protections should apply in federal court 
requires peeling away the labels and looking instead to the policies underlying 
the potentially conflicting laws. The next Part will survey the relevant 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the Rules Enabling Act. Then, the 
following Part will demonstrate a superior way of examining these sorts of 
Enabling Act problems. 
II. THE CONFUSING SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
The current confusion surrounding the application of anti-SLAPP 
statutes in federal court proceeds from the Supreme Court’s most recent 
sojourn into the relationship between the Federal Rules and substantive 
rights. The Rules Enabling Act—the federal law that vests the Supreme 
 
34 Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 274 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
35 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan, 
JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (“Rules 12 and 56 do not provide that a plaintiff is 
entitled to maintain his suit if their requirements are met; instead, they provide various theories 
upon which a suit may be disposed of before trial. California’s anti-SLAPP statute, by creating a 
separate and additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits may be disposed of before trial, 
supplements rather than conflicts with the Federal Rules.”). 
36 See, e.g., Cuba v. Pylant, 814 F.3d 701, 719-20 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the anti-SLAPP motion’s standards are irreconcilable with Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, and that the 
statutes “must yield” to the Federal Rules); Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1188 (Watford, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 “together . . . establish the exclusive 
criteria for testing the legal and factual sufficiency of a claim in federal court” and that anti-SLAPP 
statutes “impermissibly supplement[] the Federal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action”). 
37 Judge Kozinski’s analysis was especially problematic because he began by trying to abstractly 
characterize anti-SLAPP statutes as “substantive” or “procedural.” Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 273 (Kozinski, 
C.J., concurring). Doing so puts the cart before the horse. Looking to the policies underlying the 
provisions—within the context of the litigation—to see if they conflict better exposes whether a 
provision has more substantive or procedural aims. Regardless, this Comment argues that simply 
assigning labels to provisions does not resolve the problem. Examining how the policies underlying 
each provision interact is more fruitful. See infra Part IV. 
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Court with the authority to promulgate rules of procedure for the lower 
federal courts—specifically precludes the operation of rules that “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”38 But discerning what constitutes 
an impermissible alteration of substantive rights has not exactly been easy. 
Shortly after the Enabling Act went into effect, the Court decided a series 
of cases, trying to make sense of challenges to the validity of the Federal 
Rules. The Court first clamped down on attempts to contest the application 
of the Federal Rules by announcing that a Rule is valid so long as it “really 
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them.”39 Although this test remains the 
black-letter question for a Rule’s validity, concerns arose regarding its ability to 
insulate just about any provision from real scrutiny—no matter how great its 
impact on substantive rights.40 The Court then began to backpedal by limiting 
the scope of certain Rules that appeared to conflict with substantive state 
laws.41 Then, the Court in Hanna v. Plumer reasserted the “really regulates 
procedure” mantra.42 The Hanna Court doubled down on the primacy of the 
Federal Rules over conflicting state provisions, emphasizing that the Rules’ 
purpose is “to bring about uniformity in the federal courts.”43 Thus, unless a 
Rule was invalid under the Enabling Act or the Constitution by doing 
something other than regulating procedure, it would control regardless of its 
impact on substantive rights.44 
Although Hanna made clear that assailing a Federal Rule’s validity would 
be extremely difficult, it shifted the debate from arguing about a Rule’s impact 
to arguing about a Rule’s scope.45 To its credit, the Hanna Court did try to 
forestall such scope challenges by instructing courts not to refrain from 
applying a Rule just to avoid a “direct collision” with state law.46 However, it 
 
38 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
39 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
40 See, e.g., Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1032-33 
(1949) (discussing how certain Federal Rules might be invalid). 
41 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (finding that a 
state-required bond for derivative stockholder suits did not conflict with Rule 23); Ragan v. Merchs. 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (holding that the filing of a complaint per 
Rule 3 did not toll a state statute of limitations, which required that the defendant be served with 
the summons before tolling would begin). 
42 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
43 Id. at 472 (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)). 
44 See id. at 471 (instructing that courts can only refuse to apply a Federal Rule if it 
“transgresses . . . the terms of the Enabling Act [or] constitutional restrictions”). 
45 See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 35-36 (2010) (noting that “the Justices sought to clarify the 
circumstances in which Hanna’s test for the validity of a Federal Rule . . . would apply”). 
46 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73. 
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was not long before the Court asserted that Hanna’s test would only govern 
when “the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the 
issue before the Court.”47 The Rule’s breadth is determined by its “plain 
meaning.”48 Most of the Court’s modern cases regarding the Federal Rules are 
decisions about the scope of individual Rules. But they often lack any clear or 
coherent way to determine that scope, notwithstanding the Court’s 
admonition to follow the Rule’s “plain meaning.”49 
Then, in 2009, the Court seemed poised to rethink, or at least clarify, how 
to handle the relationship between state procedural provisions alleged to 
protect substantive rights and the Federal Rules.50 But sadly, the Court’s 
fractured decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co. only added to the confusion.51 Three separate opinions offered 
competing visions of how to tackle the effect of the Federal Rules on 
substantive rights. Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of five Justices, 
reaffirmed the post-Hanna test of determining first whether the scope of the 
Federal Rule covered the same issue as the state provision, and second—if 
applicable—whether the Rule was valid.52 The majority then determined that 
a New York provision limiting the ability for class actions to recover under 
New York substantive law “attempt[ed] to answer the same question” as Rule 
23’s class-action certification procedure.53 Eschewing arguments that the 
Court need not find a conflict between the two provisions, the Court read 
Rule 23 as providing the exclusive method for determining the viability of a 
class action in federal court.54 Hence, according to the Court, the direct 
conflict was unavoidable, requiring an examination of Rule 23’s validity. 
Justice Stevens, the fifth vote for the majority’s direct-collision analysis, 
parted ways with Justice Scalia’s opinion in examining the valid application 
of a Federal Rule. Justice Scalia’s plurality maintained that so long as the Rule 
can be “rationally capable of classification” as procedural and otherwise does 
not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” then it is valid.55 
 
47 Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980); Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36. 
48 Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. 
49 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 35-37. 
50 See id. at 18-21 (noting a “closely watched case” that “presented the Supreme Court . . . with 
an opportunity to speak to” the relationship between a “New York law [prohibiting] the award of 
penalties or statutory damages on a classwide basis . . . and Federal Rule 23”). 
51 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
52 Id. at 398. 
53 Id. at 399. 
54 Id. at 405-06. 
55 Id. at 406-08 (plurality opinion) (first quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); 
then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)). In other words, so long as the Rule “governs only ‘the 
manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules 
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.” Id. at 407 (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted). 
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Justice Scalia quickly pointed out that any Federal Rule “regulat[ing] only the 
process for enforcing [substantive] rights” would be upheld.56 For Justice 
Scalia, any attempt to consider the impact of applying a Federal Rule on a 
party’s ability to vindicate a substantive right was too difficult and could lead 
to Federal Rules applying in some states, but not others.57 
However, Justice Stevens maintained that courts must be “sensitiv[e] to 
important state interests and regulatory policies.”58 Justice Stevens proposed that 
if a state procedural rule is “intimately bound up in the scope of a substantive right 
or remedy,” then courts should either narrowly interpret a conflicting Federal Rule 
to avoid its application or just decline to apply the Federal Rule.59 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by three other Justices, dissented from the 
judgment and from Justice Scalia’s reasoning. Like Justice Stevens, Justice 
Ginsburg maintained that interpreting the Federal Rules requires an 
“awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies” and that 
conflicts with such state policies should be avoided if possible.60 Because of 
this agreement between Justices Stevens and Ginsburg—an agreement 
comprising five Justices—some courts have maintained that this constitutes a 
binding decision of the Supreme Court and must be followed.61 
But regardless of the Stevens–Ginsburg agreement’s impact on stare 
decisis, their respective disagreement highlights the fundamental problem 
that has plagued the Court’s post-Hanna jurisprudence. Justice Stevens 
concluded that New York’s class-action provision fell within the scope of Rule 
23 and, because the provision was purely procedural, denying its application 
did not violate the Enabling Act.62 However, Justice Ginsburg maintained 
that there was no collision between Rule 23 and the New York provision.63 
Hence, even the five Justices who were sensitive to considering state policies 
when interpreting the scope of a Federal Rule divided over how to go about 
determining that scope. 
The confusion surrounding whether the Federal Rules should supplant 
certain state regimes is entirely understandable. Drawing a neat line between 
substantive provisions versus purely procedural provisions is nearly impossible 
 
56 Id. at 407-08. 
57 Id. at 409-10. 
58 Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 
415, 427 n.7 (1996)). 
59 Id. at 423, 433. 
60 Id. at 437, 442-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
61 See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 2010) (determining that the agreement 
requires the court to decide “whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of 
substantive rights or remedies” before allowing a Federal Rule to control (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419)). 
62 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 430-31, 435-36 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
63 Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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at the margins.64 This confusion makes the Court’s responsibility to expound 
clearly and fairly on the scope of the Federal Rules all the more imperative. 
Acknowledging that the Court is engaging in something like preemption 
analysis helps dispel much of the mystery surrounding Enabling Act 
jurisprudence and allows for reconciliation of otherwise conflicting cases. 
Preemption analysis can help evaluate the scope of the Federal Rules as 
related to state-law regimes because it allows for consideration of the 
purposes of each provision.65 And, the Court’s post-Hanna decisions appear 
to be consistent with basic preemption analysis. The next Part endeavors to 
show how the Court engages in Enabling Act preemption analysis and how 
to tease out patterns relevant to the anti-SLAPP question. 
III. THE MORE COHERENT PREEMPTION APPROACH 
Recognizing that the Court is engaging in a form of preemption analysis 
provides a superior means of determining whether given Federal Rules 
supersede state provisions, as the analysis takes account of the policies 
underlying the two regimes.66 Because the facial validity of a Federal Rule is 
almost unassailable, the question of whether the Rule is broad enough to 
create a “direct collision” with state law is practically determinative.67 Thus, 
 
64 See Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 
335 (1933) (“[M]uch of the difficulty arises from the failure on the part of both judges and text writers 
to state the problem accurately. Nearly every discussion seems to proceed on the tacit assumption that 
the supposed ‘line’ between [substance and procedure] has some kind of objective existence, so to 
speak, and that the object is to find out, as one writer puts it, ‘on which side of the line a set of facts 
falls.’” (citation omitted)); see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
725 (1974) (stating a “substantive right” is “a right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for 
some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process”). 
65 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 37 (“In an interpretive landscape where ‘direct 
collisions’ are manufactured, the same language has multiple ‘plain meanings,’ and the governing 
precedent (Sibbach) is hopelessly out of step with legal developments, it is no surprise that, since 
Walker, the Justices have lurched from one extreme to the other, giving some Federal Rules a scope 
of application broader than appears plausible—certainly, broader than necessary to escape a charge 
of infidelity to the text—while emptying others of content.”). 
66 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
(“The real question is not whether the separation [of substance versus procedure] shall be made, but 
how it shall be made: whether mechanically by reference to whether the state courts’ doors are open or 
closed, or by a consideration of the policies which close them and their relation to accommodating the 
policy of the Erie rule with Congress’ power to govern the incidents of litigation in diversity suits.”); 
see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 26 (advocating for an approach that interprets “the Rules’ 
open-ended text in identifying the source and content of litigation policies in the federal courts”). 
67 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36 (discussing how Hanna’s analysis only applies if 
the Federal Rule is “sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980))). 
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rather than trying to decide whether a Rule is “valid,” the more fruitful 
question is whether the Rule’s scope covers the matter at issue.68 
This Part first discusses the two types of implied preemption that 
generally occur. Then follows an examination of some key post-Hanna cases 
and how they utilize the modalities of preemption analysis. Finally, based on 
the case analysis, this Part will conclude by describing the patterns that arise. 
A. Conflict and Field Preemption 
Implied preemption of state law by federal law results when Congress 
exercises its authority in a way that precludes state operation.69 There are two 
types of implied preemption. The first is “conflict preemption.” Conflict 
preemption itself has two subsets. What most people would immediately 
recognize as conflict preemption—when state and federal law are 
irreconcilable with each other, making it impossible to comply with both 
federal and state laws—is the first subset.70 But another less clear-cut facet of 
conflict preemption arises when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”71 However, preemption is not always a given. If the federal law at 
issue involves “the historic police powers of the States,” courts presume that 
Congress did not intend to preempt state law.72 Also, if federal law merely 
sets a minimum standard and the states impose a more exacting standard, 
then there is no conflict.73 
The second major category is “field preemption,” which precludes states 
“from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper 
authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”74 
Courts find field preemption either because “the nature of the regulated 
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or, that the Congress has 
 
68 And, as Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would have it, considering whether a Rule 
might transgress the Enabling Act’s prohibition on abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive 
rights is considered at the scope stage of the inquiry. Compare Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 422-23 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“When a federal rule appears to abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive 
right, federal courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be interpreted to avoid that 
impermissible result.”), with id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, both before and after 
Hanna, the above-described decisions show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to 
‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests,’ and a will ‘to avoid 
conflict with important state regulatory policies.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
69 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (describing the various 
methods Congress can use to preempt state law). 
70 Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
71 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
72 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
73 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2.4 (4th ed. 2011). 
74 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012). 
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unmistakably so ordained.”75 The intent of Congress to supersede state law 
altogether may be found from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive 
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it.”76 
Field preemption often requires courts to engage in policy analysis, 
determining whether the federal interests underlying a given scheme “will be 
best served by the law being exclusive in a field.”77 In other words, the Federal 
Rules must take precedence when state regulations would interfere with 
comprehensive federal policy.78 But, preemption is unlikely if the state law in 
question serves important state interests.79 
Finding “important state interests” can provide a handy escape device for 
courts concerned about the impact of a federal scheme on state policies.80 
However, if courts believe that applying federal law is important, then 
recognizing a comprehensive federal scheme gives ample excuse for 
preemption. As the next Section will show, utilizing this preemption analysis 
is helpful in understanding the Court’s post-Hanna jurisprudence. 
B. Preemption Analysis Applied to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Although the Court does not explicitly apply preemption jurisprudence 
to questions regarding the scope of Federal Rules, its confusing array of cases 
makes more sense when viewed through a preemption prism. Effectively, ever 
since the Court adopted its “really regulates procedure” mantra, most of its 
attention has focused on the scope of the Federal Rules, rather than on 
questions of validity.81 In crystalizing the “really regulates procedure” test, 
Hanna made it nearly impossible to prove that a Rule is invalid. Thus, claims 
will almost always rise or fall on the scope of a Federal Rule. Given that scope 
is essentially the ballgame, it should come as little surprise that the Court 
treats Enabling Act cases like preemption cases. Finding a narrow scope 
 
75 Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988) 
(noting that state law mandating a particular outcome cannot override Congress’s deliberate decision 
to give federal judges discretion “in a single ‘field of operation’” (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)). 
76 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
77 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3. Of course, if Congress chooses not to legislate in a 
given area, then that question is left to state legislatures. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 29. 
78 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text. However, as Justice Stevens highlighted in his 
Shady Grove concurrence, the analysis of whether a broader reading of a Federal Rule might violate 
the Enabling Act counsels interpreting the Rule more narrowly. 559 U.S. 393, 422-23 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842, 845 (1999)). 
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allows the Court to avoid applying a Federal Rule. Meanwhile, interpreting a 
Rule broadly lets the Court choose to supersede state provisions. 
Over the past few decades, the Court has built on Hanna’s foundation and 
crafted further refinements, many of which typify its preemption 
jurisprudence. For example, the Court said that if state and Federal Rules 
cannot coexist “side by side . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of 
coverage without conflict,” the Federal Rule must control.82 And like 
preemption cases, if the Court believes that federal law should prevail, it 
determines that the scope of the Federal Rule is broad.83 Conversely, if the 
Court believes that important state interests are at stake, it narrowly 
interprets the Federal Rule. 
1. Enabling Act Avoidance Canon: The Walker Narrow-Read Pattern 
Since Hanna, a number of cases have been decided in which the Court 
avoids applying the Federal Rules. These cases seem to detract from Hanna’s 
“really regulates procedure” test.84 However, when viewed from the 
perspective of preemption analysis, these cases make sense as paradigms of 
the Court’s determination that important state interests were present.85 
The first major case that arose in the wake of Hanna was Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp. Walker dealt with whether Rule 3’s statement—that a lawsuit 
commences with the filing of a complaint—preempted state statutes of 
limitations that required serving defendants before the limitations period 
expired.86 To Court watchers, the case was essentially a rematch. Prior to 
Hanna, the Court had held on similar facts that Rule 3 could not control 
because doing so would affect substantive rights by giving a claim “longer life 
in the federal court than it would have had in the state court.”87 With Hanna 
now in the books, the Court had to confront Rule 3’s impact on statutes of 
limitations head-on. 
 
82 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)). 
83 Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-76 (2000) (finding that federal 
interests counseled reading a regulation broadly to preempt state common law), with Burlington N. 
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1987) (determining that the interests furthered by a Federal Rule 
supported applying it broadly to preempt state provisions). 
84 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 
14 (1941)). 
85 Recall that both conflict and field preemption provide an escape valve for courts concerned 
with the impact on state interests. See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 80. In conflict preemption 
contexts, the Court presumes that there is no preemption if the state’s police power is implicated. 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
86 446 U.S. 740, 742-43 (1980). 
87 Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949). 
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Statutes of limitations have proven difficult to classify. Traditional 
conflict-of-laws principles considered general statutes of limitations as purely 
procedural.88 However, over time, statutes of limitations began to be viewed 
as more substantive because of their direct impact on a party’s right to bring 
a lawsuit.89 Initially, these concerns led the Court to conclude that Rule 3 
could not preempt them.90 
After discussing the Court’s previous treatment of Rule 3 and highlighting 
the importance of stare decisis, the Walker Court concluded that the scope of 
Rule 3 was not broad enough to control a state’s statute of limitations.91 Rather 
than being intended to displace state tolling requirements, Rule 3 simply 
governed “the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules 
begin to run.”92 Thus, the narrowness of Rule 3 allowed it and the state statute 
of limitations to “exist side by side . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of 
coverage without conflict.”93 
An interesting thought experiment would be whether the Court would 
find Rule 3’s scope to be the same if the important state interests bound up 
in statutes of limitations were removed. However, no such experiment is 
necessary.94 Just a few years after Walker, the Court decided West v. Conrail, a 
federal question case with tolling provisions governed by federal 
regulations.95 One would naturally expect Walker’s view—that Rule 3 did not 
directly conflict with a statute of limitations that continued to run until the 
defendant was served—would control in West. But the opposite was true. 
Rather than adopting the “plain meaning” of Rule 3 as understood by Walker, 
the West Court held that “when the underlying cause of action is based on 
federal law . . . the action is not barred if it has been ‘commenced’ in 
compliance with Rule 3 within the [limitations] period.”96 Hence, the Court 
 
88 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 603 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934). 
89 See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1945) (examining statutes of limitations 
in light of Erie analysis, and noting “a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought 
in a State court bears on a Statecreated right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly”). But see 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (upholding a classification of statutes of 
limitations as procedural because that is how they were understood at the framing of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause). 
90 Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34. 
91 Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51. 
92 Id. at 751. 
93 Id. at 752 (emphasis added). 
94 See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and 
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 701-02 (1988) (explaining the “sleight of hand” 
performed by the Court in distinguishing the “plain meaning” of Rule 3 as applied in federal 
question cases as opposed to diversity cases). 
95 481 U.S. 35, 36-38 (1987). 
96 Id. at 39. 
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found Rule 3’s “plain meaning” in federal question cases to be exactly the 
opposite of what it meant in diversity cases.97 
Trying to understand West and Walker as derived only from Rule 3’s “plain 
meaning” takes creativity.98 Something other than straightforward “plain 
meaning” analysis is going on—something that allows the Court a great deal 
of discretion in reaching its conclusion regarding a Rule’s scope.99 Indeed, the 
Walker Court’s concern over whether Rule 3 preempted a state statute of 
limitations looks like a Court deploying preemption’s “important state 
interest” escape valve.100 
As later cases have shown, the Walker Court’s narrow construction of a 
Federal Rule is not uncommon. More recently, in Semtek International Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp.,101 the Court quite obviously avoided applying a Rule 
in a way that could violate the Enabling Act’s restrictions on altering 
substantive rights.102 Specifically, the issue was whether preclusion attached 
to a claim that was dismissed under Rule 41(b)—such that preclusion would 
be binding on state courts. The Court held that Rule 41(b)’s straightforward 
statement that a dismissal “operates as an adjudication upon the merits” did 
not mean that preclusion necessarily attached.103 The Court stated: “[I]t 
would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be accorded 
federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal 
procedures of the rendering court itself.”104 As such, the Court read Rule 41(b) 
as only barring the refiling of the same claim in the same district court that 
produced the original dismissal.105 
Semtek is not without criticism.106 But it does demonstrate how the Court 
grapples with the underlying goals of the Federal Rules vis-à-vis state laws. 
Simply put, there was no clash of policies in Semtek because the Federal Rules 
were meant to govern conduct in federal courts, not create preclusion rules for 
 
97 Burbank, supra note 94, at 701-02. 
98 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 36-37 (exploring the potential inconsistences between 
the two cases). 
99 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3 (discussing how the Court can mold the scope of 
an express preemption provision by Congress through its interpretation). 
100 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 39 (highlighting Walker as an example of the Court 
trying to avoid conflict preemption). 
101 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
102 See Burbank and Wolff, supra note 45, at 40 (“Rather than directly confronting those 
problems and, in the process, revisiting Sibbach’s impoverished account of ‘substantive rights,’ the 
Court engaged in a process that can only charitably be described as interpretation and only in 
Wonderland as an exercise in ‘plain meaning’ interpretation.”). 
103 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 506. 
106 See, e.g., supra note 102. 
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all courts.107 The Court could have found that Rule 41(b) by itself had binding 
effect on state rules of decision. But this would have gone well beyond the 
Rules’ purpose to act as a uniform system of procedure for federal courts. With 
nothing to suggest a clash between state and federal policies, such a broad 
reading of Rule 41(b) would have been inappropriate. 
In addition to cases like Semtek and Walker, the Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the pre-Hanna cases limiting the scope of various Federal Rules, and 
then has utilized them to support conclusions that given Rules do not preempt 
state law.108 This practice of reading federal provisions narrowly to avoid 
preemption in situations that would raise questions about those provisions’ 
underlying validity is neither new nor unique. It mimics the approach taken with 
federal legislation that raises constitutional concerns.109 The key point here is that 
the Court often narrowly construes the Federal Rules to avoid preempting state 
provisions that appear to protect substantive rights. 
2. Don’t Tread on Federal Interests: The Burlington Northern  
Preemption Pattern 
Much of the confusion surrounding the Court’s interpretation and 
application of the Federal Rules stems from the Court’s zigzag between strong, 
broad application of some Rules, and weak, narrow application of others—as 
occurred in Walker.110 Justice Scalia’s application of Rule 23 in Shady Grove is 
emblematic of the strong, broad approach, preempting any state provision that 
“attempts to answer the same question” of whether a class action can be 
maintained.111 In other words, because New York’s class action law added a 
restriction on top of Rule 23’s requirements, it directly conflicted with Rule 23 
and thus was preempted.112 Yet, we cannot derive a “do not add requirements 
on top of the Federal Rules” standard from Shady Grove because other cases 
have held exactly the opposite—that state laws can impose additional 
 
107 See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503-05 (discussing numerous problems with giving Rule 41(b) a 
broader reading). 
108 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (citing Ragan v. 
Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949), in support of a conclusion that New 
York’s damages standards should apply); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1983) (finding no preemption between federal 
regulations and state laws—even though they involved the same subject matter—because each law 
served different purposes). 
109 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (declining to read a statute in a way that 
would raise constitutional concerns about the federal government’s ability to regulate state-government 
actions via the Commerce Clause). 
110 See supra notes 91–93. 
111 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 399 (2010). 
112 Id. at 399-400. 
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requirements not included in the Federal Rules.113 While no one can be sure 
of how the Court will view the breadth of given Federal Rules, it is still 
possible to detect a key pattern from the Court’s more recent cases. 
Specifically, if other federal policies support a broader reading of the Federal 
Rules, then something akin to field preemption can occur. 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods114 exemplifies a situation where 
field preemption explains the Court’s result.115 Specifically, the Court found a 
clash between a Federal Rule and a state statute, even though the two did not 
directly conflict. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 allowed an award of 
damages and costs if the court of appeals determined—at its discretion—that 
the appeal was frivolous.116 Meanwhile, an Alabama statute required the court 
to impose a penalty if the lower court’s decision was affirmed without 
substantial modification.117 However, Alabama also had a separate rule 
governing costs for frivolous appeals that was equivalent to Federal Appellate 
Rule 38.118 Hence, the statute imposing costs for straight affirmances was not 
seeking to punish frivolous appeals. Despite the fact that Federal Appellate 
Rule 38 and the Alabama statute targeted two different scenarios, the Court 
still found a direct conflict.119 
Conventionally, Burlington Northern’s result is difficult to explain, 
especially given Walker’s apparent desire to avoid needless conflicts. Yet, 
looking at Burlington Northern as engaging in something akin to field 
preemption allows for reconciliation.120 Notably, the Court highlighted how 
the “cardinal purpose” of the Enabling Act was to authorize “the development 
of a uniform and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and 
procedure.”121 The Court expressed two concerns with giving a narrow reading 
to the Federal Rule in favor of the state statute. First, it emphasized that the 
Federal Rule was discretionary, but the state statute was mandatory.122 Second, 
 
113 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (holding that a 
plaintiff could be required to post a bond for derivative stockholder suits per New Jersey law, even 
though the Federal Rules did not require such bond). 
114 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
115 Burbank and Wolff, supra note 45, at 39. 
116 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 3-4. 
117 Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1975)). 
118 See ALA. R. APP. P. 38 (giving the court discretion to award damages and impose additional 
costs for frivolous appeals). 
119 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 100 (1992) (finding field preemption even though the state provisions did not necessarily conflict 
with federal regulations). 
120 See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 38-39 (“[W]hereas the Walker Court was preoccupied 
by conflict preemption, the Burlington Northern Court was, tentatively and alternatively, suggesting 
the possibility of field preemption.”). 
121 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 7. 
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“the purposes underlying the Rule” were coextensive with those of the state 
statute.123 That is, they both occupied the same field of regulations governing 
financial incentives regarding appeals.124 In an apparent effort to bolster its 
argument, the Court then cited a number of federal rules and statutes 
governing costs and penalties relating to appeals.125 
But finding a “direct conflict” in a conflict-preemption sense is impossible 
in Burlington Northern: the two provisions did not conflict and both could 
coexist. Nonetheless, the Court found a conflict. Thinking in terms of field 
preemption makes the Court’s decision sensible.126 If the purposes underlying 
the various federal provisions conflicted with Alabama’s statute, then 
preemption was appropriate.127 
The Burlington Northern pattern of finding preemption was repeated in 
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.128 This time, the case involved a contract 
with a forum-selection provision.129 Alabama law disfavored forum-selection 
clauses, and the district court concluded that the otherwise discretionary federal 
transfer provisions gave way to Alabama’s substantive contract law.130 The 
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court first asked whether 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
controlled the request for a transfer per the contract.131 
After determining that the very purpose of the federal provision was to 
give judges discretion in ruling on transfer motions, the Court concluded that 
the two provisions occupied the same “field of operation.”132 Specifically, the 
Court stated, “Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern 
transfer within the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single 
concern . . . would defeat that command.”133 Alabama’s mandatory provision 
made it impossible to “exist side by side” with the discretionary federal 
provision; thus, federal law preempted.134 
 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. n.5; Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 38. 
126 However, the Court’s opinion would have been more convincing if it had cited every federal 
provision dealing with financial incentives regarding appeals, rather than just a handful. Burbank & 
Wolff, supra note 45, at 39. 
127 Id. at 39. 
128 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988). 
129 Id. at 24. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 29. 
132 Id. at 29-30 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987)). 
133 Id. at 31. 
134 Id. (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)). 
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As with Burlington Northern, Stewart’s reasoning leaves much to be desired. 
It created a conflict where none was apparent.135 And, because there was no 
direct conflict, the Court appeared to engage in field preemption, but without 
reference to other federal provisions indicating that federal law occupied a 
field.136 Had the Court recognized the existence of a federal regulatory 
scheme, granting federal judges unhindered discretion in enforcing 
contractual agreements despite state law holding the contract’s choice invalid, 
the result in Stewart would be more sensible.137 Instead, the Court leaves only 
hints that it is engaging in field preemption.138 
In short, the Court seems to rely on reasoning akin to field preemption 
where it believes federal policy interests favor a broader reading for certain 
Federal Rules.139 Hence, if other bodies of federal law exist and seem to have 
purposes at odds with state rules, then there is the possibility the Court will 
find a conflict through field preemption logic. But absent overarching federal 
interests, the Court has fewer means to give a Federal Rule a broader scope. 
IV. PREEMPTION OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES BY THE FEDERAL 
RULES IS UNNECESSARY 
Nothing in Rules 12(b)(6) or 56 requires preemption of anti-SLAPP 
statutes. In short, the policies underlying each do not conflict. While the 
Rules simply establish transsubstantive methods for testing the viability of 
cases in general, anti-SLAPP statutes create a special means of handling 
unique problems associated with specific state-law claims. Although the two 
share commonalities, they do not conflict. And anti-SLAPP statutes thwart 
no apparent important federal policy. Thus, there is neither a direct conflict 
nor an intrusion into a field occupied by federal interests. 
 
135 See id. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how Congress often expects state contract law 
to govern issues of contract validity and in the absence of an express preemption provision—as occurred 
in the Federal Arbitration Act—it is inappropriate to find a conflict with traditional state contract law). 
136 Rather, the Court focused on Congress’s intent to give district judges discretion in handling 
transfers under § 1404(a). Id. at 29-30. 
137 Cf., e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405-09 (2012) (finding that a component of 
Arizona’s immigration law—S.B. 1070—interfered with the “federal statutory structure [that] instructs 
when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process” (emphasis added)); City of Burbank 
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1973) (finding field preemption where local laws 
would interfere with the ability of federal regulators to make decisions based on given circumstances). 
138 See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 30 (“Our cases make clear that, as between these two 
choices in a single ‘field of operation,’ the instructions of Congress are supreme.” (citation omitted)). 
139 See Stephen B. Burbank, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 517, 537 
(1995) (“With the source of the applicable law turning on what may seem to be the fortuity of federal 
lawmaking arrangements, it is an understandable temptation to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules 
speaking when they appear to be silent, or at least to hear enough noise nearby to silence state law.”). 
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Anti-SLAPP statutes are embedded in substantive concerns about 
whether adequate protection exists for defendants in suits involving speech 
or petitioning activities.140 Because these statutes protect potential 
defendants from abusive litigation, simply writing them off as “state 
procedure” and refusing to engage in conflict analysis is inappropriate.141 Like 
statutes of limitations, the “policy aspects” of anti-SLAPP statutes must be 
analyzed for conflicts with the policies underlying the Federal Rules within 
the context of the litigation.142 
This Part proceeds by first examining why Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not 
necessarily conflict with anti-SLAPP statutes. It then analyzes why field 
preemption, similar to that in Burlington Northern, would be inappropriate. 
Ultimately, these conclusions rest on an examination of whether state and 
federal interests conflict, so as to require preemption.143 
A. There Is No Direct Conflict Between the Federal Rules and 
Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
Asserting that anti-SLAPP statutes cannot coexist with Rules 12(b)(6) 
and 56 ignores the fact that the policies underlying both do not conflict. As 
Semtek and Walker demonstrate, courts must consider the policies behind the 
provisions to determine if a direct conflict exists.144 Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 are 
procedures for dismissing weak claims. They are meant to work 
transsubstantively across various causes of action.145 Their purpose is to 
determine as a matter of law whether a party has asserted claims with 
sufficient basis to proceed forward.146 In contrast, anti-SLAPP statutes 
 
140 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
141 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (explaining that many 
rules that lawyers classify as “procedural” actually have important implications beyond procedure and, 
hence, must be considered “substantive” in the context of Enabling Act questions). But see Makaeff v. 
Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (classifying anti-SLAPP 
motions as mere “procedural mechanism[s] for vindicating existing rights”). 
142 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980) (noting that a rule requiring 
actual service on a defendant promotes the policies served by a statute of limitations); see also supra 
notes 88–92. 
143 See id. at 751-52 (determining that no conflict occurred based on the policies underlying the 
federal and state provisions). 
144 See supra subsection III.B.1. 
145 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 (1982) 
(discussing how the original understanding of the Enabling Act was that “procedure” meant 
establishing rules of court). As rules of court, the Federal Rules cannot create “substantive legal and 
remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.” Id. at 1121 n.750 (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 1190, at 9 (1926)). 
146 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2713 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; see also Kevin M. 
Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 833 n.47 
(2010) (discussing how the “standards of decision . . . for issues of pure law are identical” for both 
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establish protections for defendants in specific causes of action. In short, 
conflict preemption does not exist because complying with anti-SLAPP 
statutes does not abrogate the operation of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. 
Together, Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 motions make the pretrial litigation process 
more efficient through “speeding up litigation by eliminating before trial 
matters wherein there is no genuine issue of fact.”147 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
asks the court to determine whether the complaint sufficiently states a claim on 
which relief can be granted.148 The motion is judged according to the 
plausibility standard: “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”149 
Meanwhile, Rule 56 instructs the court to grant summary judgment to the 
moving party if there is no genuine issue of material fact left for a jury to decide 
and the movant is otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law.150 The 
motion will come after “a full opportunity to conduct discovery” on the issue.151 
By contrast, anti-SLAPP motions are not meant to make the litigation 
process more efficient. Instead, their purpose is to curtail harmful litigation.152 
Many states have found, as stated by the California legislature, “it is in the 
public interest to encourage continued [speech and petitioning activities on] 
matters of public significance.”153 Defending against a SLAPP suit can be 
costly—the mere threat is often enough to silence a potential whistleblower 
or advocate on a public issue.154 Even though the suit is likely meritless, a 
deep-pocketed plaintiff can utilize the costs and delays associated with getting 
 
motions and serve gatekeeping functions); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 
431, 487-88 (2008) (explaining the “weeding out” function of both motions and criticizing their 
potentially insurmountable evidentiary requirements for certain plaintiffs). 
147 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes to the 1946 amendment; see also  
FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s notes to the 1946 amendment (stating that the dismissal 
occurs when “there is no genuine issue as to any material question of fact and [the moving party] is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). 
148 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 146. 
149 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). 
150 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
151 Id. at 257. 
152 See Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2010) (explaining that the purpose 
behind anti-SLAPP statutes is “to provide a quick remedy for those citizens targeted by frivolous 
lawsuits based on their government petitioning activities” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 821 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Mass. 2005))). 
153 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015); see also Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 
691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (describing that the purpose behind Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2017), was to protect those who choose to speak 
and petition publicly from being hit with meritless suits meant to waste time and expense); Opinion of 
the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedure), 641 A.2d 1012, 1014 (N.H. 1994) (listing states that have adopted 
anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the exercise of speech and petitioning rights). 
154 See, e.g., 2 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
LAW § 19:27 (2017) (discussing how SLAPP suits can be tools to “exhaust” speakers “into silence”).  
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a case dismissed through the general process to dissuade negative speech.155 By 
singling out slander, libel, or other speech-related claims being used to silence 
speakers into submission, anti-SLAPP motions protect civic participation.156 
As it turns out, states may have good reason to be concerned about 
whether the usual dismissal process sufficiently protects defendants from 
abusive speech-related suits. Despite the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
making it easier for defendants to dismiss weak claims under Rule 12(b)(6),157 it 
is still possible for plaintiffs to sufficiently allege defamation.158 In refusing to 
give the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute effect in federal court, the 
D.C. Circuit stated that a claim “may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that 
actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable.”159 If the claim survives the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the defendant then faces the prospect of burdensome 
and costly discovery.160 Hence, the usual procedures may not be enough to 
protect defendants from abusive suits. 
Requiring a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success on the merits to 
sustain a claim allows states to give what they perceive as adequate protection 
in specific state-law causes of action implicating speech.161 A major mistake 
of the D.C. Circuit is its refusal to recognize the important distinctions 
between anti-SLAPP motions and motions for dismissal or summary 
 
155 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, required a plaintiff to prove “actual malice”—that the 
defendant knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, spread false information against a “public 
official.” 376 U.S. 254, 280-83 (1964); see also Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544-46 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the requirements of alleging actual malice under the current understanding of Rule 12(b)(6)). 
156 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015) (emphasizing that public civic 
“participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process”). 
157 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must state a claim to relief that has facial plausibility, and to be plausible on its face the 
complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). 
158 Actually proving these claims and prevailing at trial is a nearly impossible burden for a 
plaintiff to meet. See supra note 155; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 456-58 (2011) (affirming 
the special protection afforded to speech that involves a “public concern”). But even the more 
exacting pleading requirements under Twombly and Iqbal may not be enough to protect defendants. 
Courts have continued to find that defamation claims can survive Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See, e.g., 
Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1055-57 (N.D. Ill. 2013) 
(determining that Shady Grove precluded applying an anti-SLAPP statute and then holding that the 
plaintiff sufficiently alleged actual malice); Heyward v. Credit Union Times, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 
1190 (D.N.M. 2012) (finding that the plaintiff, a CEO of a credit union, had sufficiently pleaded 
defamation claims against a newspaper). 
159 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
160 And here, Rule 56 would be of little help in minimizing the harm because courts are less 
likely to entertain summary judgment motions until substantial discovery has occurred. See supra 
note 151 and accompanying text. 
161 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549-54 (1949) (emphasizing the 
importance of state policy seeking to protect defendants from abusive strike suits). 
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judgment162—thus ignoring the speech-protecting policies at the heart of 
anti-SLAPP statutes.163 Anti-SLAPP motions are not substitutes for 
dismissal for failure to state a claim or summary judgment motions.164 
Instead, anti-SLAPP provisions create special motions unique to cases 
involving speech or petitioning activity. They require the court to decide 
whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. Thus, in contrast to 
Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 motions, anti-SLAPP motions do not require the court 
to analyze whether claims are sufficiently pleaded or enjoy enough support to 
leave open genuine issues of material fact.165 In effect, anti-SLAPP statutes 
are policy decisions by states to balance the importance of a robust exercise 
of constitutional rights, while still providing a channel for legitimate 
defamation claims.166 While anti-SLAPP motions do get claims dismissed, 
their probability of success standard and their application to specific state-law 
 
162 See, e.g., Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333-34 (determining that anti-SLAPP statutes only regulate 
“procedure” and finding that they “answer the same question” as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56); accord 
Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 273 (2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (characterizing 
anti-SLAPP statutes as “procedural” and refusing to analyze their purpose). 
163 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
164 Indeed, the states that have adopted anti-SLAPP statutes still retained their own 
equivalents to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Compare MD. R. CIV. P. 2-322(b) (West 2004) (regarding 
motions for failure to state a claim), and MD. R. CIV. P. 2-501 (West 2015) (regarding motions for 
summary judgment), with MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807(d) (West 2010) (providing 
a motion to dismiss or stay proceedings in cases involving SLAPP claims). 
165 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
166 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (“However pernicious an opinion 
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the 
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the 
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open’ debate on public issues.” (footnote omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (stating that 
“narrowly drawn and limited” statutes regulating “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace” are constitutional). 
Here, any federal constitutional concerns weigh in favor of applying anti-SLAPP statutes. 
Doing so helps protect robust free speech. The Court’s decision in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 
Inc., provides a juxtaposition, where constitutional concerns clashed with applying state law in 
federal court. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). There, the Court faced the question of whether applying the New 
York state standard for determining excessive jury awards would violate the Seventh Amendment’s 
Reexamination Clause. Id. at 434. The Court had held that New York’s standard must apply over 
the federal standard because it was substantive. Id. at 429-31. But, it would be a potential violation 
of the Seventh Amendment to follow New York’s appellate review method of deciding if the trial 
judge erred in determining whether or not the award was excessive. Id. at 438-39. Thus, because of 
the clash between constitutional concerns and protecting state substantive rights, the Court 
essentially split the difference by saying that the district court would follow the New York standard 
for excessive jury awards, but the court of appeals would follow the federal standard for reviewing 
the district judge’s decision. Id. Anti-SLAPP provisions, however, raise no such conflict because the 
state law does not thwart First Amendment protections. 
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causes of action distinguish them from dispositive motions based in the 
Federal Rules (and other generic motions in state litigation).167 
Finally, there is no direct conflict between anti-SLAPP provisions and the 
Federal Rules because it is possible to comply with both.168 Specifically, a 
defendant to an anti-SLAPP claim can choose between challenging the 
complaint with either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or an anti-SLAPP motion. If, 
hypothetically, the defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and is denied, he may 
still file an anti-SLAPP motion. Meanwhile, Rule 56 summary judgment motions 
share very little in the way of proximity to anti-SLAPP motions. Anti-SLAPP 
motions would likely be filed at the early stages of a lawsuit—indeed their purpose 
is to dismiss a meritless claim quickly to spare the defendant needless expense.169 
By contrast, Rule 56 motions are filed much later, after the parties have had a 
chance to engage in substantial discovery.170 Thus, no direct conflict exists 
between the Federal Rules and anti-SLAPP statutes. 
Trying to claim that anti-SLAPP statutes “answer the same question”171 
as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 motions simply because they are dispositive motions 
misses the mark. Anti-SLAPP statutes serve the distinct purpose of 
protecting defendants in the context of specific state-law causes of action. 
They also do not impede the operation of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Reading 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 to avoid a conflict with anti-SLAPP provisions not only 
makes sense in the abstract; it is also consistent with Semtek and Walker. In 
both cases, the Court felt it necessary to read the Federal Rules in a way that 
avoided a direct conflict with important state interests.172 In the anti-SLAPP 
context, states have an obvious interest in keeping their tort causes of action 
from being misused in a way that implicates individual rights. Thus, finding 
that the Federal Rules displace anti-SLAPP statutes on the basis of a direct 
conflict would not be in keeping with the Court’s approach to direct conflicts 
in Semtek and Walker. Because they are constructed differently and serve two 
entirely distinct purposes that do not interfere with each other, anti-SLAPP 
statutes do not fall within the same scope as Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. 
 
167 See supra note 164. 
168 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan, 
JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (finding no “direct collision” between anti-SLAPP 
motions and determining that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 “can exist side by side . . . each controlling its 
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict” (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States ex 
rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999))); see also Burbank 
& Wolff, supra note 45, at 46-47 (explaining that proper application of a Federal Rule does not 
necessarily depend on “the putative policies underlying state law,” but more so on how the state law 
“interacts with and is implemented by the litigation process”). 
169 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 153-58. 
171 Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
172 See supra subsection III.B.1. 
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B. Anti-SLAPP Statutes Do Not Encroach on a Field of 
Important Federal Interests 
Having ruled out finding a direct conflict, the other basis for trumping 
anti-SLAPP statutes would be through the field preemption approach 
exhibited in Burlington Northern. Indeed, Judge Kozinski argued that the 
Federal Rules create “an integrated program of pre-trial, trial and post-trial 
procedures” and that allowing states to interpose anything upsets the 
system.173 But this argument has three flaws. First, it directly conflicts with 
Supreme Court precedent that has recognized circumstances where state 
provisions can be enforced in federal court.174 Second, it ignores the reality 
that federal courts themselves often add to the Rules by implementing local 
rules.175 And third, it fails to consider whether Congress intended the Rules 
to be so broad as to “occupy the field” in ways that would raise significant 
federalism concerns. The remainder of this Section shows why field 
preemption is not a compelling conclusion. 
The overarching goal of the Enabling Act is to allow for the creation of 
uniform rules to govern procedure in federal court. The Federal Rules are 
“only superficially uniform and trans-substantive.”176 The “uniformity” that 
the Enabling Act sought to provide is a common means for handling civil 
cases in federal court.177 Thus, the Enabling Act’s requirements “must be 
measured in pragmatic terms, neither fatally undermined by an approach that 
focuses on policies underlying state law on the same issue, nor cemented by 
jingoistic dogma heedless of the evolving realities of court rulemaking and 
litigation practice.”178 Further, the prevalence of local rules and individual 
judges’ protocols shows how the Federal Rules are meant to have a flexible 
application.179 And no matter how detailed written language is, there will 
always be ambiguities and gaps.180 Hence, courts regularly interpret the 
 
173 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
174 See supra note 113. 
175 See infra note 179. 
176 Burbank, supra note 94, at 716. 
177 Burbank, supra note 145, at 1095-98. 
178 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 48. 
179 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1677, 1696-98 (2004) (discussing the prevalence of local rules and efforts by Congress to deal 
with them); Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges 
Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1226-27 (2011) (noting the concern that 
local rules “threaten the national uniformity of federal procedure,” but stating that “the myriad local 
rules dealing with topics from the trivial to the vital suggest that the federal court system already 
tolerates a considerable amount of interstate and even intrastate variation”). 
180 Senate committee reports show that members of the Congress that drafted the Enabling Act 
were operating under “the notion that the rulemaking power does not extend to ‘matters involving 
substantive legal and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy.’” Burbank, supra 
note 145, at 1121 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1174, at 9 (1926)). But see Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
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Federal Rules—just as they would when determining whether preemption 
occurs in any other context. 
When examining whether federal interests occupy a field, a good place to 
start is by asking if the federal government has traditionally played a unique 
role in this area.181 The history behind federal court rules cuts both ways. 
From 1792 to 1938, Congress instructed the federal courts to follow the rules 
of the state in which the court sat for actions at law.182 However, for suits in 
equity, Congress recognized the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate 
rules governing federal equity courts.183 These Equity Rules became the 
model for the Federal Rules.184 
Even conceding that Congress has historically been active in directing the 
creation of court rules does not by itself indicate field preemption. This is 
because Congress has expressly limited the scope of the Federal Rules to avoid 
conflict with substantive law through the Enabling Act.185 The text of the 
Enabling Act speaks for itself: the Federal Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.”186 This express reservation shows that Congress 
did not intend to create a comprehensive scheme so pervasive in nature that any 
law touching on the same subject matter would be automatically preempted.187 
 
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 599 (2011) (“[A]s we have said before, Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is 
the statutory text, not the legislative history.’” (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)). 
181 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, § 5.2.3. 
182 Burbank, supra note 145, at 1028, 1037. 
183 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 9 (2d ed. 1918). 
184 Indeed, many of the individual Federal Rules derive their substance from the Equity Rules. 
See Burbank, supra note 145, at 1166-68. It is even possible to trace Rule 12(b)(6) back to the earliest 
version of the Equity Rules, promulgated in 1822. See HOPKINS, supra note 183, at 39-40 (showing the 
text of Equity Rule XVIII governing the filing of a demurrer). 
185 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (“The test of whether 
both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both 
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field . . . .”). 
186 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
187 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 598-99 (2011) (refusing to 
narrowly read a broadly worded savings clause that provided space for state law to operate); see also 
Semtek Int’l. Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503-05 (2001) (shying away from 
interpreting the Federal Rules to control the extent to which state courts must respect the dismissal 
of an action by a federal court because of the potential Enabling Act violation). There is also 
precedent for courts withholding the application of Federal Rules when they would interfere with 
substantive state laws. See, e.g., Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that 
the plaintiff had an “absolute right under Massachusetts law” to bring the defendants into the lawsuit 
in spite of Federal Rule 15(c)); see also Struve, supra note 179, at 1198-99 (noting the reasoning of the 
Marshall court and stating that “a [federal] rule is not to be applied to the extent if any, that it would 
defeat rights arising from state substantive law” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Marshall, 508 F.2d at 44)). 
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The operation of anti-SLAPP provisions does not interfere with a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.188 Judge Kozinski would have kept 
anti-SLAPP motions out of federal court because he views the Federal Rules 
as an integrated code, precluding all supplementation and expansion.189 But 
once again, the limits placed by the Enabling Act are instructive. The 
Enabling Act calls for federal courts to recognize and respect state regulatory 
arrangements that govern “economic and social activity.”190 Few things could 
have greater societal implications than the ability to chill free expression 
through costly litigation. With an absence of congressional intent to have the 
Federal Rules be a closed universe of all possible motions, courts should not 
be so quick to preempt the entire field of motions practice—particularly in 
circumstances where doing so might mean nullifying substantive rights.191 
If the federal government has enacted other laws and regulations touching 
on the same subject matter at issue, this weighs in favor of finding field 
preemption.192 Following the approach of Burlington Northern, if the federal 
government has expressed a desire to regulate free speech and petitioning 
activity, it would be more reasonable to read the Federal Rules as precluding 
anti-SLAPP motions.193 But, no overarching federal policy appears averse to 
states protecting free speech and petitioning by adding procedural protections 
that do not conflict with the Federal Rules.194 The anti-SLAPP statutes reflect 
the desires of states to protect the robust exercise of constitutional rights in 
 
188 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
189 Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 
190 Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis added). 
191 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568-69, 571 (1973) (refusing to find field 
preemption when Congress did not express a desire for exclusive federal control). 
192 Field preemption would be evident from the “depth and breadth” of legislation that Congress 
has enacted regarding an area of law. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001). 
193 Cf. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 45, at 39 (discussing how the Burlington Northern–type of 
field preemption can occur if other federal policies suggest that a broader reading should be given 
to a certain Federal Rule). 
194 Indeed, the Court’s Cohen decision shows that the Federal Rules should not be read in a 
way that would prohibit states from deterring nuisance-value suits. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949) (examining a New Jersey statute which went beyond 
regulating procedure by creating a new substantive liability). Further, because states have a duty to 
abide by the dictates of the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, there is strong 
reason for them to provide mechanisms that protect their citizens’ speech rights. See Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the 
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public 
concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (noting that freedom of speech and of the press “are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States”). 
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ways that they see fit. And the Court itself has long recognized that federal 
procedural rules should not inhibit states from protecting such rights.195 
In short, the purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes is to shield substantive speech 
rights by defining and limiting the application of state-law causes of action. They 
are not meant to undermine the application of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Therefore, 
those Rules need not be read to preempt anti-SLAPP protections.196 
Finally, precluding the operation of anti-SLAPP provisions in federal 
court would raise serious federalism concerns. Preemption of anti-SLAPP 
statutes would implicate traditional state interests.197 This consideration 
weighs heavily against preemption. Defining the contours and permissibility 
of defamation causes of action, like any other tort action, is the traditional 
domain of state law. Special procedures unique to these types of suits will 
inevitably be “so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that [they] 
define[] the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”198 States can 
construct their law to allow for quick recognition of the rights protected in 
cases like New York Times v. Sullivan, which requires proving actual malice 
when a “public official” sues for libel damages—an especially difficult task 
for a plaintiff.199 Thus, states should be able to define what constitutes a 
viable libel “claim” under their law and likewise prescribe appropriate 
mechanisms for deterring nuisance-value suits designed to chill free speech 
rather than obtain a judgment.200  
Ultimately, our federal system was designed to divide power between the 
federal government and the state governments.201 Whenever congressional 
action appears to intrude upon the traditional state prerogatives, “it is 
incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before 
 
195 See, e.g., Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 722-23 (1885) (looking to federal policy and 
constitutional norms to determine whether state law affecting procedure was preempted). 
196 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
213-14, 221 (1983) (finding that a California regulatory scheme was not preempted by federal law 
because both schemes had different purposes). 
197 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
198 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 420 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
199 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
200 See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Enabling Act’s limitation 
does not mean that federal rules cannot displace state policy judgments; it means only that federal 
rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies.” (emphasis added)). 
201 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of 
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power 
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers 
split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political 
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”). 
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finding that federal law overrides.”202 Making state speech-protecting 
provisions relating to tort claims inoperable in federal diversity suits would 
bring the Rules Enabling Act into perilous conflict with important, traditional 
state interests. Just as with any other federal statute, courts should presume that 
Congress has not intended to interfere with the historic powers of the states 
absent some plain statement.203 Nothing on the face of the Enabling Act 
suggests the intent to intrude upon how states handle matters relating to the 
speech and petitioning activity of their citizenry.204 Thus, considering that 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 need not be read to preempt anti-SLAPP provisions, 
courts should read them not to conflict, and hence avoid raising troubling 
Enabling Act and federalism questions. 
As the First and Ninth Circuits have held, Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 can be 
read harmoniously with anti-SLAPP statutes because all three of them 
answer different questions.205 Nothing in the Enabling Act forbids states 
from cabining their causes of action. To the contrary, the Federal Rules are 
not meant to regulate state-law claims.206 For to do so would be a regulation 
of substantive rights—a violation of the Enabling Act’s very text. Thus, the 
First and Ninth Circuits were correct to avoid reading the Federal Rules in a 
way that would generate a conflict with anti-SLAPP provisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The irony of ironies is that in the name of “Erie analysis,” the D.C. Circuit sets 
the federal court up as being far more favorable to certain parties than the state 
court sitting across the street.207 Denying the application of anti-SLAPP statutes 
 
202 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459. 
203 Id. at 461 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). For a broader 
discussion of applying federalism canons to Enabling Act questions involving historic state-police 
powers, see generally Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through 
the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2013). 
204 Indeed, if anything, the Enabling Act’s instruction that Federal Rules “shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right” should serve as a signal that Congress did not intend to 
intrude on the traditional domain of state-tort law. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012); see supra note 187 and 
accompanying text. 
205 See Makaeff v. Trump Univ., 736 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw & Callahan, JJ., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (stating “Rules 12 and 56 . . . provide various theories 
upon which a suit may disposed of before trial. California’s anti-SLAPP statute, by creating a 
separate and additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits may be disposed of before trial, 
supplements rather than conflicts with the Federal Rules”); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (noting neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor 56 “was meant to control the particular issues under 
[the anti-SLAPP statute] before the district court”). 
206 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (highlighting that 
any Rule which effectively alters or introduces public policy must be supported by “explicit legislation”). 
207 See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining that a case’s outcome 
should not be affected by whether it was filed in federal court or state court). 
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in federal court would effectively nullify their protection. But as preemption 
analysis has shown, the purposes behind anti-SLAPP statutes do not conflict with 
those of Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. Hence, because the two can coexist, there 
is no need to preclude anti-SLAPP motions in federal court. 
Justice Stevens and the Shady Grove dissenters noted the need to balance 
concerns about the Federal Rules with those of state policy. By requiring 
courts to consider the policies underlying the Federal Rules and state statutes 
that utilize procedure to advance substantive goals, preemption analysis gives 
courts an opportunity to discern more carefully the scope of the Rules. And 
as the situation with anti-SLAPP statutes shows, using straightforward 
preemption analysis helps courts weigh competing interests, rather than 
wading directly into difficult Enabling Act questions. 
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